The output sequence {cj} will be determined by:
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular Automata (CA) are discrete dynamic systems characterized by a simple structure but a complex behavior [ 1, 2, 31. This configuration makes them very attractive to be used in the generation of pseudorandom sequences. In this sense, CA are studied in order to obtain a characterization of the rules (mapping to the next state) producing sequences with maximal length, balancedness and good distribution of 1's and 0's.
From a cryptographic point of view, it is fundamental to analyze some additional characteristics of these generators, such as linear complexity or correlation-immunity. The results of this study point toward the equivalence between the sequences generated by CA and those obtained from Linear Feedback Shift Registers-based models [4].
In this paper, CA hybrid configurations constructed from combinations of rules 90 and 150 are considered. In fact, a linear model that describes the behavior of a kind of pseudorandom sequence generator, the so-called shrinking generator (SG), has been derived. In this way, the sequences generated by SG can be studied in terms of CA. Thus, all the theoretical background on CA found in the literature can be applied to the analysis and/or cryptanalysis of shrinking generators.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIC STRUCTURES
The two basic structures are introduced:
A. The Shrinking Generator
It is a very simple generator with good cryptographic properties [5]. This generator is composed by two LFSRs: a control register, called R I , that decimates the sequence produced by the other register, called R2. The sequence produced by the LFSR RI, that is {ai}, controls the bits of the sequence produced by R2, that is { b i } , which are included in the output sequence {cj} (the shrunken sequence) , according to the following rule: According to [SI, the period of the shrunken sequence is
(1) and its linear complexity, notated LC, satisfies the following inequality L2 z(L1-2) < LC < -L2 2(L1--1).
(2)
A simple calculation allows one to compute the number of 1's in the shrunken sequence. Such a number is ~~. l '~ = 2(La-1)2(L1-1).
(3)
Thus, the shrunken sequence is a quasi-balanced sequence. Since simplicity is one of its most remarkable characteristics, this scheme is suitable for practical implementation of efficient stream cipher cryptosystems.
B. Cellular Automata
An one-dimensional cellular automaton can be described as a n-cell register, whose binary stages are updated at the same time depending on a k-variable function [3] also called rule. In CA, either all cells evolve under the same rule (uniform case) or they follow different rules (hybrid case). At the ends of the array, two different boundary conditions are possible: null automata whether cells with permanent null content are supposed adjacent to the extreme cells or periodic automata whether extreme cells are supposed adjacent.
In this paper, all automata considered will be null hybrid The main idea of this work is to write a given SG in terms of a hybrid cellular automaton, where at least one of its output sequences equals the SG output sequence.
A SHRINKING GENERATOR LINEAR MODEL IN TERMS OF CELLULAR AUTOMATA
In this section, an algorithm to determine the onedimensional linear hybrid CA corresponding to a particular shrinking generator is presented. Such an algorithm is based on the following facts: Fact 3: Rule 90 at the end of the array in a null automaton is equivalent to two consecutive rules 150 with identical sequences. Reciprocally, rule 150 at the end of the array in a null automaton is equivalent to two consecutive rules 90 with identical sequences.
According to the previous facts, the following algorithm is introduced:
Input: Two LFSRs RI and R2 with their corresponding lengths, L1 and L2, and the characteristic polynomials Pz (D) of the register R2.
Step 1: From L1 and Pz(D), compute the polynomial P(D).
In fact, P ( D ) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E, where E = 2' + 2l + . . . + 2L1-1.
a being a primitive root in GF(2L2).
Step 2: From P ( D ) , apply the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm [6] to determine the two linear hybrid CA whose characteristic polynomial is P ( D ) . Such CA are written as binary strings with the following codification: 0 = rule 90 and 1 = rule 150.
Step 3: For each one of the previous binary strings represent- binary string is notated S.
concatenate both strings S, = S * S'.
times.
Output: Two binary strings codifying the CA corresponding to the given SG.
Remark that the characteristic polynomial of the register RI is not needed. Due to the particular form of the shrunken sequence characteristic polynomial, it can be noticed that the computation of the CA is proportional to L1 instead of 2L1. Consequently, the algorithm can be applied to SG in a range of cryptographic interest (e.g. L1, LZ M 64). In order to clarify the previous steps a simple numerical example is presented. Step 1: P ( D ) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset 3. Thus, P ( D ) = 1 + D2 + D5.
Step 2: From P ( D ) and applying the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm, two linear hybrid CA whose characteristic polynomial is P ( D ) can be determined. Such CA are written as: 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Step 3: The two binary strings of length L = 10 representing the required CA are: Once the corresponding initial states are known, then the cellular automata will produce their corresponding output sequences and the shrunken sequence can be univocally determined.
In fact, CA computed by the previous algorithm will generate all the possible sequences {xi} that are solutions of the difference equation The linear consistency test [9] is a general divide-and-conquer cryptanalytic attack that can be applied to the SG on the basis of the linear models provided by the cellular automata. This attack would require the exhaustive search through all possible initial states of the LFSR Rz .
0 A new attack that exploits the weaknesses inherent to the CA-based linear model can be also considered. Such an attack will be specified in next section.
v. PHASESHIFT ANALYSIS OF CA SEQUENCES
If the Bardell's algorithm to phaseshift analysis of CA [ 101 is applied, then it is possible to calculate the relation among the sequences obtained from CA. In fact, in [lo] it was shown that the characteristic equation determines the recursion relationship among the bits in the output sequences of a hybrid 901150 CA. A shift operator was used in conjunction with a table of discrete logarithms to determine the phaseshift analytically.
Although the characteristic equation in [lo] is a primitive polynomial P ( D ) , it can be proved that the algorithm is valid for P ( D ) too. Let S be a shift operator defined in GF(2) which operates (8) (9) on Xi, the state of the i-th cell, such as follows: On the other hand, we have: Studying the distance among the shifted sequences and concatenating them, the original sequence can be reconstructed. Nevertheless, the shifts among the different shrunken sequences depend on the particular structure of the automaton considered. In fact, once the automaton is known the Bardell's algorithm has to be applied.
In this paper, the relationship between LFSR-based structures and cellular automata have been stressed. More precisely, a particular family of LFSR-based keystream generators, the so-called Shrinking Generators, has been analyzed and identified with a subset of linear cellular automata. In fact, a linear model describing the behavior of the SG has been derived.
The algorithm to convert the SG into a CA-based linear model is very simple and can be applied to shrinking generators in a range of practical interest. The key idea of this algorithm is that the number of steps to be carried out is proportional to L1 instead of 2L1.
Once the linear equivalent model has been developed, the linearity of this cellular model can be advantageously used in the analysis and/or cryptanalysis of the SG. Besides the traditional cryptanalitic attacks (e.g. the linear complexity attack that here requires half the sequence needed by the BerlekampMassey algorithm and the LCT attack), an outline of a new attack that exploits the weaknesses inherent to these CA has been introduced too.
The proposed linear model is believed to be a very useful tool to analyze the strength of the sequence produced by a SG as a keystream generator in stream ciphers procedures.
